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RECENT DECISIONS

INSURANCE-RIGHT TO PROCEEDS OF POLICY ON LIFE OF DIVORCED

SPOUSE-Plaintiff was beneficiary of certain life insurance policies issued by
defendant on the life of her former husband. All of the policies involved were
issued after the marriage and before the divorce, and plaintiff had paid all the
premiums on the policies. The- administratrix, decedent's second wife, claimed
the proceeds on the basis of section 425 of Kentucky Civil Code of Practice
which provides for restoration of property obtained from the other spouse by
reas~n of the marriage upon judgment for divorce. Held, where the wife has
procured and paid for insurance on the life of her husband a subsequent divorce
does not abrogate the contract, and she is entitled to continue to pay the
premiums after the divorce and to collect the proceeds of the policy upon its
maturity. Ficke v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, (Ky. 1947) 202 S.W.
(2d) 429.
.
With this decision Kentucky has abandoned a line of cases 1 to the effect
that the wife's interest in the policy on her husband's life is divested by divorce
even though she has paid all the premiums and procured the policy,2 and has
adopted the ~e prevailing in many, but not all,8 jurisdictions to the effect that

1 Schauberger v. Morel, 168 Ky. 368, 182 S. W. 198 (1916); Western & S. L.
Ins. Co. v. Webster, 172 Ky. 444, 189 S. W. 429 (1916); Western & S. L. Ins. Co.
v. Nagel, 180 Ky. 476, 203 S.W. 192 (1918); Eversole v. Eversole, 169 Ky. 234,
183 S. W. 494 (1916); Guthrie v. Guthrie, ·155 Ky. 146, 159 S.W. 710 (1913).
2 However, if she paid the premiums out of her own earnings or property she
was entitled to be reimbursed to the extent of the premiums so paid, with interest
thereon from date of each payment. Schauberger v. Morel's Administrator, 168 Ky.
368, 182 S.W. 198 (1916); Sea v. Conrad, ·155 Ky. 51, 159 S.W. 622 (1913);
Eversole v. Eversole, 169 Ky. 234, 183 S.W. 494 (1916); Western & S. L. Ins. Co.
v. Webster, 172 Ky. 444, 189 S.W. 429 (1916).
8 In Texas it is held that a wife's interest in a policy of life insurance on her
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in the absence of a policy provision to the contrary or regulation of the matter
by statute, the rights of the beneficiary in an ordinary life insurance policy are
in no way affected by the mere fact that the beneficiary is divorced from the
insured subsequent to issuance of the policy.4 The Kentucky rule was based
wholly on statute u which provides that upon a judgment of divorce there should
be a restoration of all property either party has obtained from the other by
reason of marriage, the court going on the theory that an insurance policy .is
"property" within the meaning of that statute. In this case the court stated that
it would not blindly follow erroneous decisions of the past based upon the. misconception that the wife obtained the policy on her husband "by reason of marriage" when she had procured it and paid all of the premiums thereon. As a
general rule, a life insurance policy, originally valid, does not cease to be so
_by reason of the cessation of_the insurable interest of the beneficiary in the meanwhile.6 The purpose in requiring an insurable interest at any time is to prevent
wager policies, and the courts following this majority rule go on the theory that
assuming a proper insurable interest at the inception of the contract, the purpose
of the rule is sufficiently attained, and the contract continues to be valid despite
termination of the insurable interest. 7 It is reasonable, therefore, to hold that
a beneficiary does not lose her rights in an insurance policy even though her
i~surable interest does cease upon divorce from the insured. 8 Those jurishusband's life ceases upon obtaining a decree of divorce even though it be obtained
through the fault of the husband. Hatch v. Hatch, 35 Tex. Civ. App. 373, So S. W.
411 (1904); New Eng. Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Spence, (C.C.A. 2d, 1939) 104 F. (2d)
665. Quebec courts follow the same rule. Hart v. Tudor, Quebec Rep. 2 C.S. 534
(1892).
4
Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457 (1876); McGrew v. Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 132 Cal. 85, 64 P. 103 (1901); Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 46 Conn. 79 (1878); Begley v. Miller, 137 Ill. App. 278 (1907); Filley v.
Ill. Life.Ins. Co., 91 Kan. 220, 137 P. 793 (1914); Wallace v. Mut. Ben. Life Ins.
Co., 97 Minn. 27, 106 N.W. 84 (1906). Grego v. Grego, 78 Miss. 443, 28 S. 817
(1900); McKee v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 28 Mo. 383 (1859); Overhiser v. Overhiser,
63 Ohio St. 77, 57 N.E. 965 (1900); Rhodes v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 109 Ore.
586, 220 P. 736 (1923); Marquet v. Aetna L. Ins. Co., 128 Tenn. 213, 159 S.W.
733 (1913). Also see 52 A.L.R. 386 (1928); 59 A.L.R. 172 (1929); L.R.A. 1915
D 130.
5
Civil Code of Practice, § 425, provides, "Every judgment for a divorce from
the bond of matrimony shall contain an order restoring any property not disposed
of at the commencement of the action, which either party may have obtained , • .
from or through the other, during the marriage, in consideration or by reason thereof."
See Ky. Rev. Stat. (1944) 403.060.
6
Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 32 S. Ct. 58 (1911); Caldwell v. Grand
Lodge U. W., 148 Cal. 195, 82 P. 781 (1905); White v. Brotherhood of American
Yeoman, 124 Iowa 293, 99 N.W. 1071 (1904); Bowers v. Mo. Mut. Assn., 333 Mo.
492, 62 S.W. (2d) 1058 (1933); Steinback v. Diepenbrock, 158 N.Y. 24, 52 N.E.
662 (1899).
1
Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457 (1876).
8
Sea v. Conrad, 155 Ky. 51, 159 S.W. 622 (1913); Hatch v. Hatch, 35 Tex.
Civ. App. 373, So S.W. 411 (1904), hold that the insurable interest of the wife
ceases upon divorce and this is apparently the general rule, however, in Begley v.
Miller, 137 Ill. App. 278 (1907) the court- held that the fact that the decree of
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dictions adopting a contrary rule base their decisions on the theory that the
reasons for requiring an insurable interest at the inception of the contract are
as strong where an insurable interest, once existing, has terminated,, as where
no insurable interest ever existed. 9 However, it is worthy of comment in the
principal case that the court refused to pass on the situation where the insured
procures the policy and pays the premiums, but in dictum the court suggested
that in such a case "it might well be said that the insurance was procured by
the wife by reason of the marriage, and under the code and statutory provisions,
must be restored on divorce." It is submitted that the Kentucky court may
well follow that dictum since section 425 of Civil Code of Practice will be much
more difficult to circumvent where the husband has paid the premiums himself.
In most other jurisdictions where there is no such statute the former wife's
right to the proceeds on death of insured is recognized even though the insured
procured the policy and paid all premiums thereon himself.10
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divorce orders the husband to pay alimony gives her an insurable interest in his life,
which will continue at least during the time the alimony is payable under the decree.
9 ln Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Whiteselle, (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) 188
S.W. 22, affd., (Texas 1920) 221 S.W. 575; Hatch v. Hatch, 35 Tex. Civ. App.
373, 80 S.W. 4II (1904).
10 See cases cited in note 4, supra.

